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Title DE GAU:L,.LtEAND

F'Rl''1-NCO~GE;FUv1ANf1ELA~10l'

S 19!t5.1962

Abstl'Qot appt>oVlSd

The'd1Sluemberment and reparations policy FrMnQfJ follow-

ed at the end ot World War II as 5n oocupying power in Germany
WtilS

til

t:radl tional Qpproach

or

the vietor to the vanquished.

The Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland were the borderlands
long in dispute.

One new element was the idea that while

demanding these territories, an attempt at

roohement could be carried on through

natfon~l

educatlon~l

r8pp.

measures.

For mmyGermans the University at bhllnz did not balance.

the dl$n1Qntled factories.
This postwar period
economic 111s.

The 1947

w~s

characterized by European

l~arshall

Plan, an AmericQn ap-

proach to restore Europe to economic health through
operative erfort, was inaugurated.

00-

It, st1mulQteo. the guro ...

pe8n integration movement which flourished during the 1950's.
The 1948 Council of Europe had not lived up to
in the eyes of

}I~uropefin

ex.p~ctstions,

federalists; but the next try, the

European 001111 and Steel OOlnrnuni ty. (1952) proved a lusty

child o,f the funotionQlist movement.

\1hen theF:uropem

Defen.se Cornrnunit'y died, (19,$4) it embittered FrQ,nco-OermQrl

relations for

.Q

while.

The EUI'ope&ilu Atomio Energy Community

,9,nd the :&;uropean Economio Corrununlty completed the EuropeQn

Community in 1958.

Through the o.t'ganizatlons foreconom.l0

integra tion, Franoe snd GermatlY have, in spl te of disputes

and crises, been able to compromise

11{,l.8JlY

divergent drives

in the interest of restoring Europe to full economic

ity.

cQpac~

The North At.l~ntleTre,\ty Organization, (1949) which

o~lg1nated
\~'estern

lisa jo.1ntmi'litary defense and symbolized

unity in the fQceot Soviet aggression, became a

a.,edbed of discox'd between France met Ge.r:rflany.

'When Genersrl de Gaulle beCQme president in 1958, he
p-ur·scued. "n active poliey of rapproachement wi'th Adenauer t 8
Fed~rail

GertnQU Republleseek1ng to establish a Paris-Bonn

.

'/H~sP:

'

axis on which to base French Ie aderahipln the European

Community.

As leader

of the United St'ltes,

o~ ~

West EuropeQn bloc independent

Fr~nce

would hold that place in the

first rank of na tiona thQ t de Gaulle

be:liev~d

she must have,

Oh«;.neellor AdenQueV cooperated with the French president
bea·~.use

he believed a tightly knit

fit GermSin

lnter~st$.

Europe~n

group would bene-

The high point in Franco-Germm rap-

prochement occurred in 1962 during the $ummer exchange of
atQte visits, but by the time the 'l'reaty

WQS

signed and

ratified, (1963) the tone of' Franco-GermQn relations had
chtlilnged.

Disagreements on mil! tary polioies in NA'lIO,on pol! tic~l

developments in the !.iuropeG-rl Community, and on agri-

cul turQl poli..¢1es in E&1C .. :ill res.ohed serious proportions
&t the time that Chancellor Ernll.rd took offioe in 1963.

i],'he Erhard governrnent' a shift 01" emphasis f:rom at Europe

focused on Pranee to the Atlantio allianoe focused on the

United states led Presldent de Gaulle to consider

Ii

new

pOlicy to replaoe FrQnco-German rapprochement whioh had
been his primary strategy until 1963.

Frs.nco-Russian re-

latioDS became notioeably 'Warmer atter the extension of
long term credits by France 'to the Sovifl./t U:nio:n.

protested this new turn 1n French policy.
Russian
th~

r~18tionahlp

Germany

A closer French-

tn".,. add. to the discord which cooled

Franoo-Germ9n aocord of 1962.
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DE GAULLE Ac~D FRANCO-GERMAN RFLA,TlOOS,1945-1965
I. DI TRODUCTION

France and Germany are major pillars ot western
European strength,

Their rels,tionshlp to each other is

significant in determining the course ot European history.

France entrusted theguldance of that reletionship to
Charles de Gaulle when he beoame president of the Fifth
French Republic 111 1958.

The seven years of hi$ term 10

otrice saw major shifts. In' Franco~G.rman rela tiona,.
pu.rpose of this paper 1s

to

The

eXaM.lne the developmen ts that

took plaoe during thia time in order to understand ho-wand'

why this relationship progressed as it did.
However, nQ pErrlod in history 1s a self-corl talned un! to'.
The events
ential in

with

or

the post World Wer II era, wereext:remely influ-

88 u8b11~h1ng

~rend$

de Gaull.' s world.

begun before he came toott1ee.

He had to deal

The o:rganiza-

tions which promoted close contact with Germeny werae shaped
under the Fourth Republic.

The foreign policies which set

the tone of' Franco-Gattman relations were formulated by hi.
predecessors.
reject policies
his own.

The new president had to accept, adapt, or
al~ead1

in operation as well as originate

At the end of World War II Fran.ce
position.

WiltS

in a difficult

The military defeat of 1940 had shown that she

was unable to defendj herself against German armies.

The

J,

ocoupat1on,.~ndu;red until

all110st the end of the war,

had exhausted 'the Frenoh economy.

The relatively minor role

foreign

France played in the allledV'1ctory did notrtlnstateher

9,8

a gz-eat power. 1 WheniCharles de Gaulleoame to powerbriet'11 at the end ot World War II, he set forth three goals tor

French tore;ign pollcy.

and great power status,

military security, eoonomic recover,.,
WhrOU~lout

most of the Fourth

Republic, the tiret two goals were the main objectives of the
French goverrunen t.

To atta.in military security, the tbreat of Germany had
to be destroy-edt

In August 194$, Generel de Gaulle told

President Truman ot the P:r:·ench dem.ands tor

dcmi11tari.ed

Ge:rD18n1~

The a.ax-wQs to

ail

dismembered Bnd

beoom~

French prop-

erty; the Ruhr was to be detached from Germany end put under

international control, to be used to benefit Ge:rma.nl'8
neighbors,

The Rhineland was to be pr$vertted trom ever be-

coming an invasion route to Prance; Germany wou.ld be,demi11tar1~ed.

In order to prevent the rise of another milt-,

tant tlermanY', NQzl Ideaswere to be ellm1nti.ted through the
stressing ot dem,oor$tic prinoiples in German schdols.

lstQtlley Hottman, In Searoh of France (Ne~ York:

and Row PUblishers, 196)T, 31~.

--

Harpel'

3
'rhe German goyernmen t would be

I t eorgaulzed

in a demo-

cratic form. 1
The political s1tuatiml ohanged rapidly after
de Gaulle maa.e claar the Freneh post tlon regarding Germany.-

The lJold war oS.used the tIn! ted States and, Sri tal.n to look
on West Germany &s a potential ally against the Soviet Uniono
They c.omb111ed their occupation zonas and began to plan what

became the central gov$l"nmental institutions of a future

Germany.

Throughout 1945 and 1946. Franc, consistently re-

Jeoted the trend toward centralization fQr- Germany.

She

fesl"ed that accepting cen.tralized institutions would also

me:an acoepting the existing boundaries

or

Germany end thus

force her to rellnquishcla.lms to the Saar and the Runr. 2
Oentralization of German Instlt'utlons would also mean 1nter-

terence in ho\lo1 j"ll'ance ran her zone of occupied Germany.
Since F!lrance intended to Qchleve part of her economio scour-

.tty through exploitation of he:r oocupation zone, ahe fought
centralizing measures.

In the search tor

}f~enoh

economic

security, exploitation of the occupation zone was an expediency.Long l-ange pla.ns were aimed at bolstering the

Fl-eheh economy through possession of the Saar-'s coal and
80cess to the Ruhr and Rhineland industries.3

Unexpectedly, a basis for a Franoo-German
IF. Roy Willis, ~ren~ei ,Ge..~~l' and. the New E~rope
(Stendord: Stanford universfty· Press,1.96'5T; 1'";";

-

3Ibid., 32.

4
rapprochement was laid in the
sarne time that
end

]!~f.j.nce

r(:?p8~a tiona.

FI~ench

oocupation zone at the

was pursuing a policy ofexploi tatlon

'.rh1s was the educs: tlon9,l pl)ogram insti.·

tuted by France, ranging

f:rOrll

reforms in the German primary

,schools to the foundation of the new University of

~hl1nt.

'Youth programs of religious andpoli tica,l orge.nlzations

were encou.r'aged and many co:ntBots between French and German
'youth were sponsored by the governruent to

German

re~vive 41

a d.'i'f!11"U t10n for French civil1zatlon. l

The third. goal of ,French foreign pollcy set by
de Gaulle in

194L~

lay dormm t during most of the .l1'ourth

Republic, being revived only during its l$ter years.
de GAulle had set the keynote of the search f()r

8.

General

return 'to

great power status tor France when he said France m.ust
llresume a plaoe in the :elrat rank'-· and »m,a1ntain it. n

He

had hoped. to achieve this first rank through acc}ord wi th

the Soolet Union, but the opposition of the Soviet Union to
French representation in the German ocoupation ended Fl'enoh

hopes ora Fl raneo-Russ1an a111s.n08.

Even the x·ole of a third

par.. ty m.ed,.iator between East md West

WfiUJ

prealuded by the

Russia!) att1tude.Fl aIlCe had refused to Jolnher zone with
l

those of Britain and the United

S~tQtes,

had accepted

Germany's 'b1astern front leI's , had. included. the Soviet Union
on .French pl6al1s fov -th$ internQ,tionalization of th.,

auhr,

but all this feiled to earn Russian gratitude and cooperation

Q

s the .French had hope.d.

E1' i ta1:n an.d the Un 1ted

States ind:tcated t.helr t4111ingness to coopere_te with French
d~siW1S,

but the Soviet Union refused, though the French

Connnun,iat }')arty supportJ'd France t a program. 1

bids for great power stfJ.tus tniled, end

When F:renoh

F~ench

hopes tor

econolnic and 10111 tary secur1 tl through explol tation of

Ge"onny faded,

$

new polley had to be developed,

American action provided directio:n for

approaoh to r@lat1ons with Germany.

&

newF'rGrloh

On April 12, 19J+7,

'Walter Lippmann pUblished 61n article, "Cassandra Speak.1ng, t.
in whioh he w61rl1ed that q'rhe truth 11 tbstpoll tics.! and

econo:mie meS.8ures for Axtie:rlean aid to 'Europe on e. scale

l4hich no reeponslbles'tatesman has yet
will be needed. in thE):n6Xt yeel' or

v~ntured

$0. »2

to .hint at

As if lntulfille

men t of thl s prophecy, General George Marsh&ll, in June 19L.j.. 7 I
proposed

Q

plan ,tor American aid to

reconst~u(~tEuropet

Mo,rshall Plan Rid waato· Iflake J'ranee no longer depe.nden t on
theeJiPloi ta t1on()t' GeJ'!1lsny.:3

Another faotor whlchQa.used Franoe to change her
policy

tow~.rd OeJmlar~y

was._ g:c'owing apprehension of the

Sov'!et Union.
lWillis, ~.2.

2Herbel't Luethy, France At)81nst Herself (.New York:
ftleridian Books Ino. I 19;$), 3~J. ,. . ~
3\"~:tl1i s I

29.

6
Some developments which indioated that prospective da.nger
lay with RUBSi. rather thQn Germany
in Czeohlosovak111, the Berlin
~la:r8hQ1IP1.n

fusal of

l'J~re

the COftlMUnls't coup

blookad~,

and

th~

Ruseifm re-

These events persuaded France

aid.

to accept the London Agreements of July 1948. 'These .gree-

or

mente denied :mast
InsteQ-d of

Q

F1"anee'e original claims in Germany.

perman en tly 1nternational1zt')drtuhr, the

te~~p

orary International Authority tor the Ruhr (:rAR) was
established; 1n plaoe ot • sep.rate oocupation zone, a de-

layed

~lB1on

with the combined British and American zones

was arriltlged; and in lieu

ment,

Q

or

a deoen tr-.11zed German govern-

tight tederatlonwas provided.

Although the Frenob

poed.. t10n on the 8a,,1" wa 8 recogI1 tzed, no provision for the
Rhineland

WQS

made.

The major p.ttoblem t.eing the Fow.. th

economio l'eeovery.

•

n~w m~thod

R~public

was

The }1arahall Plan provided Frsnce wi th

to Qohieve this.

Not only was money made

available to reoon8truotEurope's economy-,-but the Plam demQnded that the EuX'opean oountries part101p#ting must practice clQee eoonomic oooperation.

JunfJ5,

1947,

covery 1s

In a speeoh .t H8Pv.rd on

General Marshalllns1sted that economic re-

ftth~ ·bu~iness

or

the Europe.ns.

• • • must come fromP1urope.

• • •

The

The in! ti.tive

progr~m

should be a

joint one agreed to by .. number, it not all E:urop49n nations. n

1.~., 23 ..
2Eugene Wll Castle, The Ore. • t Giveawall (Chioago: Henry

Regn~ryComp.n11

1957),

~

-- -

--

7

The

Europe~ns

we:re to work out production levels to be

achieved for the next four years and decide how much would
be needed to :make up the difference between what could be
earned by the E;uropetAn exportse:nd whG t had to be expended.
for European economic recovery.
re~$lonal

The preamble of th.e cong-

act which made General Marshall's proposal law

stated specifically' that th. pu:rpose

This Arr!ex:~can stimulus to

courage European 1rltegratlon. 1

Europes.nun1 ty boosted the spirits

worked
raeQns

th~

ot the ftEuropean.s't

hoped for a United states

tild

ot the aotwas to en-

or

who

Europe.

By this

beo~me

F...u ropean

rOQus of ,FrffJnoh foreign policy

unlfica tion.•

At first. the French had

very broad conoept of th.

8

Europe Wl11ch unification would enoompass.
ministers

or

The roreign

Great Britain and France, Bevin andBldault

respectively, invited f1t·st Soviet foreign minister Molotov,
and then, every other Eu.ropeall foreign minis ter to confer

with tbemon the be,stway to gr,asp the initiative which
General l'fla:rshall offered.. 2

The refusal

ot the Soviet Union

ond of the other East Buropenn countI-ies to Q,ocept 'Maarahall
l?lari aid 11m! ted partners

Q.va11abl~\,.for

ment to the natiollS ofWest-.,m

Europe~

E"urapean unity w•. S an invitation
}t'~urope~n

the European move-

The next os.llto

1~sued

by enthusisstic

faueralis ts to the beneficiaries of the Marshall

loAn thony N'U t t ing:,Euro;eeW111
It'7tederi ok Is II ~Pl'Q eger, 1960)" Ie;-;2Ibid.

!.2!

~!.~ (New York:

8

Plan to torm the Oouncil of: Il;u:r-ope •
.fiiuropean feder'll:tstshopedthereby to st.rt a poll tical
1ntegrs,tlon of Europe,

i'he Council was to be the t'uturt par-

liament of .. United Sta tee of lturope, but Dri taln vetoed

any propo$Ql that would m.ke the Council 3lnythlng strongoX'
than a oonsultative body,l

In doing eo, ahe further naprow""

the Frerleh choice ot pa:rtners tor .. trulY' integrated Europe.

The only other country of

eompa~.ble

size &nd resouroes with

which Franoe could align hex-selt ",.sWest Germany.

. Betore. Franoe and Germany oould tom the h.ub o.f ..
unified We$te1'7l Europe, old Ftllench, derna-nas had to be abandoned.-

However" :ma.ny Froncr:unen, even as lat. as Novemberl9$O,

were not reconoiled to

on the Saax-or
lu~tQnoe

by

~e

thought ot rel1.nquish1ng

furthe~ ~eparat1.ons.

claim~

-rx-ance showed her

re~

at first opposing the PetexaebeZ'8 Protocol whioh

admltt.d Gerro..ny to the Council ot Europe, diminished the
dismantling of German faotories, gave the Germans a voice
in the IAR, and gr·an.ted Germany

~l.rshall

Plan

&1.

id.

Sinoe

most of the dismantling had b.en ·in the French zone for export to France, it 18 not
ists objected. 2

su~prising

that French industrial-

At the same time approximately that French

businessmen and Indu:strla11sta were raqulred to accept the
PetepsbergProtoool, they were presented wi th

8.

whole- ne w

outlook on France' srelatlonehip to German'y by Frenoh
1

.Ibid., 26.

9

funetlon6itlists.

unity by

Q

Ftlnctionaliats ai:med at Slttaining Eur'opEHUl

step by step

p~oe~ss

in which limited functions

Their new look

are performed through'soupr4lnatiQnal powers.
for French industry

bas$d on a realist1c 9ppralsfil of

WIlS

Europe's need to destroy old barriers and a

d~t6rm1n.tion

to oper~ FrancefsprQteeted economy to freer trading. 1
The immediate economic taotorfJ that induced -lean ,lvlonnet and

.his cOllea,gues t·o draw up the Schuman Flm "W,ere the situation of overproduotion':1n< coal and steel which &'Urope faced
just before the Ko.pean \'\I61,;r and the neceaa1 ty of better protection ft'om the flu01;Ua.t$,,?:ns ot the· bus;lnes8 cycle, for

both oonsume;r and produQer~

Europf!Jall COfill and

Ste~laom.l11unity

E:Ul'opean eoonomic I11s

or Eose

ine£rl(~1ent

(:IDOSO) to>help solve

well as provide thefoundatlon .ror

6S

The .greates t eeonom1cQaset to

eventuail po;J..i ticalunlon.

France

~rne Sohuman Pliln .founded the

-wee &lceessto RUMooal, eVen though the
.f'"

•

mines in oth'er par;8 of France

we~eput

out

of business +3·
For ulany the
Schum~n

morelnrp<>~tant

Pltlin was political

19& ther

issue .t stQke in the

than

eeol1011l1e.

The exe-

QutivebrQtich of ECSO,cIJlled the High Authority, would be
the key to a

cheok.on.I'~vtt~,llzed

Germah

1:ndustry~

Qveto'

to future German arrrua.menta irJ.duB try; wd thus to Gern1&n
~.bili ty

to make

war.

The price of this check would be the
....',

--

3Ibld., 104.

.*1:

sacrifice

or

on

a certain amount of Frenoh sovereignty.

this issue the Europeiln integrationists took the st&nd that
nationalism was passeI tortoday's world.

Whe1r opponents

maintained that nationalism was a. legitimate viewpoint and
that thelsaw no reasont.o ~egQl?,d a European nationalism
1.8

supel'1o~

to FrenohO"ational1sm. 1 'While some Frenohmen

SQwECSC as .. sacrifice of French sovereignty, Germana
it in jtl..stthf!' opposite light for themselves:
o'p(e~~.tlon~

an end to

True, Ger:man>opponente to West Ellropean$uprs-

patti>n$.-J..ln t-srat1oncolliplairJ,ed ot- 11m! ted
distrusted-Frenoh oompetlt:1.on in industry;
F~enoh

SGW

aovepe1gn~1;
·sus;pecte~·a
,

.'

p:l.an todom1nat@Lp.o11tlcally, .and tear-edtheeff'eet

on>ttiture German un1r~oat16n.

In sp1 te or these o omplaIn't. ,

the overwhelming German des!:pe to end ocoupation status

lett no real question ot'German acceptance ot the SohumQn
Pl~tl,2

In 1952...rt'ert"Wo years of .plannlngand. violent

deba.te, the Sri t1sh rejected EJCSC, but b"trance ,; Italy"West

Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands_ and' Luxembourg

aec~pted

it.
The functlona1.1,ects who designeagCSO buil'tinto it
f~ .. ~ures

that oould Peused to develop

tederated EUt'ope.
wa$ seeuxlely

~a,1d.

Q

very closely

The foundation tor a new European trend'
The organization

or Eose

branches set a

. , .laay"mo.nd Ar~n,Franc!,'.Steadtast and", ChQn~lnSi (CQmbrldge,
}t1QasQchueettst
HarvardOnlvers!l;y iSress, 196 ), 1.59.
"

2 Willis, 112.

11

pSittern readily adaptable to ne\4 Qdditlons to the li:uropean
COIrulluni ty." Tbe European Cormnuni ty
of:

lUi

a whole 1s comprised

themuropem Coal Qnd Steel Community (EOSC), the

European Atomic Energy Community (EuratoJJl), and the
bluropean Economio Comtl'1unlty (EEC, usually clalled the Cotnrt1on
r1arket).

E$ch of the three component$ o.t the European

Oommunity (ECSe, :mEO, end .Euratom) has 1~s own i,ndividual
exeeu.tlv,e.1~hfJ EOSe

exeoutive b:rQrloh 1s called the High

Authol'tlty; the EEO and Euratom deslgn&\te theirs as Com-

missions.,

This Branch 1s to guard .ESSe intere s ts by ini t-

lating and

advocQ~ll1g

legislation to put

t~eaty'

provisIons

into effect, by l'Qisl:ngrevenue to cilrryoutits Qotionsl

bYP911cing ECse torreapect to the treaty and High Authority
rulings, by aiding 8.greements between' m~mbers,

anab,-

stimtl-

la ting turthev aotion lnbuildlng the European Oorrmrunl t;r.l
There is Jl.lso an EOSC' Oouncilor :Hln18ters which acts as
decIsion'lflaking body.

This Council consists' or national

.repr e sen;atlv8$ who havepoweZ'$

whl~h,

in some cases, are

:1mmediQtely binding on all membe:rs. ' ,On several l$sufts

there is no :natlonral veto, the deoision being taken by
Ima.jority vote.

This bodydeeides on spec.ific proposals

made by-the exeout1vebrBnch.

Me and J£uratom also halve

sepa.ra te eouno lis of m1n istera,bllt the same men usually
___ i .

_

I,

12
.sit. on all th~ee oounc11s. 1
i11e oth.x- branches of the l~uropean Community are'

shared in' common by ECSC,EEC~ and ~uratom,

juc;r101ary, &xerciaing the power

JU$tioe

&$

eouJ:'t.

:tts seven JUdges glv&

andgov!J:t.'~ent$.

f~Ql

The Court ot

or

Q

supreme

decisions on indiViduals

The Cour-t deoides if the acta of the ,three

oomponen ts of the Oomm.un1ty accord with tb.aome Trea't1
~h~o~ es;abllshed thern.T!1e' European Parllment c6ul.(i'be
-

.'

- -

.

con.~·"'d.,r8d the leg1$1.t1'\1:.,~::br.nch of the EuropeQn eptrIt~unlty.
~

'.

-

,'.,

--

. ",

~,

.

'

..-,

.

~

'.

~hf8':.$s.mbll QOlls1s~~f ot'142 delegates nom1n·.',tedbY' .
.

.... :.,

,national

p~r:t.iament$.;

These delegates

a~t' nqt

.seated in

na;t;tbnal g:rQup,. bu t in .t3.p~8tlIi tl on$l po11't10'8.1 groups:

Con-

,-

aerv.• tl ve

tr'om -. Italy" Prince ,Germany and othe:r member na.

tIO);f$ 8~ t together •• one,gvoup.

r.sl'gnation

or

The Pa:rllam~n t catltoroe

theexeeut1.,vets (EOSO High Authority.EEO and

Eu-r'''tom Commissions )1)~.tw()-th1rds vc;>te ot.no oonfidenoe.
~"',,,

-,

:;": ... ,:,'

-;'"

",;. :.'

1t1:$ con$ul t •. t1,.e oo",ce"t-.ln m. tters and publj.sh,esf-ts viewa
on executl'V8 .Ot1on8~ '$'bX'OUgh the assemblyts ritt~t)l"l standing ,ooram! t'Peea, it

wo~ks~owar'd

the fusion of markets and

e.x.~:oilne s b udga t $~2
Accredited amlHUIt!adors to the EuropeanCo11'mnmit'Y' from

the ns.tlonal gove;l"nment$otrnembersta,tes make up
1 ttee of Permanent

aepX'es~':ntatlvea..

~i8

Q

Comm.

group processes

de'tailed doouments, determines nation.tl positions and aots
2I,b1d., 21.

13
as 11ason betweentheo

thr'e~

Oo:m.."'nunity

f>h~present~_t1ves

member nations' govevnmertts.
Isbor, 1.ndtlstry JI

busin~ss,

the Eoonomlc' $ndSoci&l
~cts

as

Q

~xecutlv~:a

land the

of V'4Ilrious

-$ndprot'ess!o.nal groups m411ke 'Up

OOfl'uuittee.

p:ressure group,ls

This Comtnittee, whioh

o~on$ultQtivebodYQttQdhed

Q

to the Council of 141nis ters. 1
Tbus through

them~H;~hiner'1

,from all economio polioy

ch~l'lged

of the Community FrlffiCe

or

exploi tQtl~n, wltnGermany
withGttI~nany

in the role of v1ot1mto Ob.e of oooperat1on,
lit

partner.

The.'littempt' to e,xtend the Corrununi ty to

cov~r

':m.l1ttary policy tOWQ~GeltrrUjlnS" p~oved lesa suocessful.

as

a

The

'Bluropoan. Deten$~ ,pommun1ty (EOe) was a. ,Frenchetto:et.eto
less~n

the impQct ora rearmed Germany,2

This effort grew

out ot the events, beginnIng in. 1946, which l:ntenalf'led the
Cold l'Jar and createdllin atmosphere- oC

elsewhere • .3

:fe~r

11'1 France, and

The e5trlte$t~!$:.ot'cm to this te&P of Soviet

sggresslon: 1nWestern Eul'ope wQsthe signing of the Atlen tic
Ps,otin

Ap~ll

1949,

OrgQ:cizQtlon ('NATO).

cre~ting

Itl

'w8sexcludet1 from NA'l'O.
9.1 Assembly in 1949,

the North Atlantlc Treaty

hance's view, ot course,
In s, session of the Frenoh

~'oreign

Germ~ny
r~"tlon-

t-'llnlster Schuman stated that

Germ.ny should never be able to

rea~

"except by

Q

graYe

(Js

-

lIbld., 121.
2E. Drexe 1 Godfre'9~ , Jr"

(2d ed; Nell1York;. TholUQS

.3Luethy,

355.

'1.

~jhe Gov~rnn1ellt otFr~e.nce

CrowerIOomplilniJ-r9b~l,r97, •

14
er~oron the p~rt 01" Prance. tt1
Considering France's position on Germfiuresrmarnent, the
out1?:reQk of the'KoreanWar preoipitated a sftuQtion which
placed&. tremendous str.alt.l. on }J"'rQ.,rlco-Germ&lo relsitlons·.
FjaElt""W~st

,tensions

reduc~d

FrQuee'" a role 1nthe ,Atl"nttc

Ql.~i.noebeOQuse hercommitl)'!ell,ts

co'U~d no,tnu~keQ larg~,mir1.tary

outside Europe mem't she
eOlltrlbu:tlon to N AtrO

(I

Germany;, on the other hand,ach1eved a more 'active p8.rt in
.
interna,t40nal arrairsbecQUS80fher ml11taz.y potentlQl.2
.

--.wrthAlllerloan troop$oontrl11.. tted to the Korean War, Qdd-

ltlonal United State's force$ for Europe were unlikely.
Consequently Europe's military weakness

WIi$

evident at a

t1tl1.~when

European tena1onswere' also rlsing.3

ot:mu,t'ope

propo8edaEu~ope$ln

funds glthere-d from

Eurdpt',~n

or: Oer,'m,n pa:rtioipation.

Th$ Oouncil

army finan-oed by EuropeQn
taxes, but mAking notnen t10n

1'he United. Sta.tes

deeld~d

thQt

Ge~~"n p~~~;Plo'1patlon was neoessary.4
.

,-

,

:

When troth tb$ 'Unit.,Hf 'StQ tea and the Councl1qf·Europe

cQl',1.11'1gfor EurQpeantroc):p~, Ren' Plevefl, . the·

FX-tU1Ch

produced Q":1' pl4in . for aEu~opeQn Defense Community.

'premier,

'£ho

jPleY~ll 'Pl~n hoped to ,aontt:a.ioQ raearmed Qerm~y.': "bY' ititegrQ t ..

lng' <}ont1nental'europ~$!l,;·,rmed.forces into 6heml1ftiiry

lAltred Grosse:r,"'Prance and. Germany 'in the Atlantic
Communi ty, ff Inte:rna t1on~lOl)t?iQn1$atlQn,XVII.·. (SUltUner, 1963,
554~"

...

2~,'t?ld., 555.

..

..

3W1111$,

-

145,.

4Ibid., 131.

1,
estt.ilblishment which would operate under" 8uprQnatlonal
politlctil author! ty oontrolled by-the governments 61:, the

,Premier Pleven ~,nd supporters

pQrtieipants" ttl

o:r

the 'plan

(1) (lermany WQsnot a m~mberot the

stressed these polntst

Atllult1c Pact but did benefit 1'Z.Onl the Fa.ct's protection;
thtIJU?e.r()~e

she should share in the defense ot

W~atem

Europe trom possible attack; (2) tba pl$n would turther
Eu:ropeilr1 integration; (.3) Frsnoo-GermGn reooncl11Ailtlon
wPuld be promoted; and (4) GermarlY would bekept.tromh.ving £\ na~tionalQrmyr.2
Deba tea

over

1ltpGW~X'.··long

Imd

ha.rd~

Freriobopp()n-

epte prO,ies tedtha t th~,' s'upran'tti onal aspects of .the, plan
'~-:',':':

",'>- ,";::" ,"

For $ome:~ Gerrrilhl l'earmament in any fO~W'tS- un.

>

'

::

•• , ) " " " , ,

"

"';

.oeep1a~ble;· others it~,~;edthat suoh an arnl'ymightpr()voke
Russian

inte~vent1on.

Pr,~chcr1tics

,also

p("lnted:Ql.t-~
.

th~,'¢rlgin&l

.

•

•

'.

thQ t

'.

plan had b.enmQc;ilfled to allow ' n.atio;nal units,

S11d,·~:thatthe »,r~nch Q~mt,.''Which'
had calYlm1 tm~ntsln, At:V:i.oQ
-'>.' ;' '.:'. , ,
.)
,

I

'

.

; .. ,~._ ,",', : _, ': ;':' ','

Qnd~~1ai would ,beWe~k"t1;~d., by;
,::"'.

:

the

'.<. :, . ':-',' ..,.:-.

sUP~i.natiOn611:q~R11ty

or~})c..3 ·Placing the. Gertn4\ns, under a supranat1onai'liluthorlty meant tha~, t~$ ,Gerrtume would be su.b3ecttot~~t auth6ri tYQnd not at tbe dfspoeal· ~f
;

"..!,"."

~.;-) :

the

qerxruln goverllmen t.

'r

Bt the same token French,:broops committed

toF~DC

be \~nder the direction· ottheFrench govertunent.

'-

would not

16
The bitterness

debates over

,Eve:ry

Af'fair.
01'1

rono

engend~red

by the prolonged Qr.td heARted

haa been compared to th,,-t of the

F~rench

Dr~yrue

political group spelled out; its stliind

this issue, thus hBrdenlng attitudes towlitrd it.

The re-

vived nationalism thi',t appeQred in both Frtinae and GermGlny
'WQS

a set-baok to Franco--German :r~COllo111atlon.l Gernumy

WQS

particularly Inoensedbect.use the' Contractural Agree-

ments. which were to restore German sovere1gnty,were tied
to the a.cceptanoe of EOO.

When the It''lrenoh,llri tlsh md

Amerioan foreign ministers met in Washington in Septe'rrtber
1951_ they decided German p'trtioip~tlon in EDO 'Would mean
the$nd of ocou.patlol1status.1'heretore, the ag:reenl&nts

providing tor an :Independent Federal Republic ofOe:rmany

were negotiated simultaneously with the m11itQl-Y arrange-

The Cotltractu8.1Agreements could onlybecorneef.fec-

ments,

tive when (Jermany partioipated 1n
saw

tal

Ene •.

GeI'mQny naturally

denial of Qerx.nan 8ove1"elgnty 1n. the French reject:lon

of EDO.2

&ermQrl sovereignty md rearmament had to 'Wait

until the Western

Europe~ln

Union WtitS forMed Qnd attached to

NATO sho~tly after the

1954 death of EVa. 3 At thRt time

West GermQny

atomic,

renouno~d

bQcte~iolog16al

and ohemlcsl

wetipons, pl"oed all her troops under NATO, and entrusted
-(.

IThe?s

t bid "

we~e

1.77).

2 Ibid ,.

137.

lilleo hellhd arguments in Gerllumy.

.'

.3Edg&r Stephenson. Furn.iss,Jr., _It'ranee Troubled A111
Harper ~nd Brotb~rs.. 196oj, 273.

(New York:

17
West Berlin exolusively to ,American; British Qnd Frenoh

protectlonClf 1

The effect of East-West tensions on the FI'filnco-German
rapproehement

18

WQS

aooentuQted 1nsid,e N'ATO.

Because Berlin

totally dependent on Ame:r1oarl £o%'oe$ vis-~ ..V'is the

$0

Soviet Un1on,Germany.found het-self
siding with the united
:;
"

stl.te~

on issues d.ividing the Un'! t,ed Stat~8 and France.

Frs-nee's d1esatistactlon l\rlth NATO stemmed pr1marl1Y.from
'herpos1t1on as a nation hQ,vingoolonial oommittuents Qnd
fpolliber stand on nuolear'a:rms~ French unhappinessW'Qs,

a1'80' linked to a renewed French interest 1nnationQl prestige"

whioh began aboub1.9".

!rhePrenob Qrguedtha:t the Atl.a:nt1c Pact

~equ.l:r~d

co..

operation'Unong its memOevs throughout the world, even in

Asia •.nd Atric.ul*

Ola1mingto act as .. de1l'1ocra tie nation
"

fighting communism ID"Vletnam and

Alge:r1Q~

NATO to aid 1n cAr'r11ngout that task. 2

.

:FrQnoe expeeted

In8te.~.

or

aid,

her N'A'PO allies, inoluding Germany, crt t1c18ed Franoefo:r
belngunwil1ingto terminate colonialism.

France reacted 01

aoouslng NATO of not doing ita job andot humiliating

with such criticism.

The F'ourtbReptibllc f s reluctance to

relinquish Frenoh colonlesoan be attributed to

motlv~s

na tional prestige rQthe,I' th$Il economic' rtUilSOTlS,3

lKlausEps te1n. germanl After A4.enauer (New Yorkt
Foreign Policy Association, 1964'. 6J•..,...
,

20rosser,

558.

Fr~ce

3A~on, 15).

ot

18
The nationalism. wh1chocC$.sioned the

F~ench

colonialism alsopro.moted Franoe t $ desire for

voice lnthe oontrol of Nl.lolear arms.

Q

stand on

greater

posae$~lonor nu-

clear weQpons beQa:me a l1~o,ssary status symbol tor a great
P9W~:r. .~ . role FrQ!ice l1ished to play.1

Dlseonten ted with

the pOf;lltion,tnat the United States alloted her NATO allies,
·:A-:

France ultlm,.tely

deo!d~d

to establish anindependellt French

nucleQir t'o~oe,Prerofer Hende's.F'ranoe ,. put ,the program into
,

I

()per~tio;n~n 19$4~

SlnceEure,tom was to stimulate and

00-'

ordil)ate nuoleQX' research, Frmce expeoted to use it to
benetither I;luelfHu' program."
Eurll~omettort8

German insistence that all

be directed at purely peaoe.fUl purposes

foroed France to vel inqu:lshtha.t hope J accordingly, dlmini,sh~d

French, lnteres,t

d~lprived mUI'Qtom

of muoh ot ita

v1ta11ty.4
In

0

on trias t to theobsQ,url ty into

its twin, the, Europeiln
atlc'.dovel.opnJ.ent.
a:".r~l'le,w~d
Th~y',

whl~b

r~oonotnlc ..Op~Wlity;

Both EUr'Qt,pnl -11.q

:arwo

E1;trQ tom lapsed,

experlenOedd;ram-

were the result of

drive by the!ur¢'p-ean tunction,Jl11st movement.

were conceived at,hiJ4esslna Conferen.ce, in·'1955'·an<i

-took: shape during two yeQX"$ of negotiations.
lFurnfss',

246'.

The

~r.rreaty

2Godf~ey. 128.,

.3 B;uratom pe:rf'oI'l'&sits fUnotions 'through 'speol.fleresearch.contraots,a docu:m.enttiltlon pool, investment gUidance
Qnd health snd safe:by st"nclards.

(Robox-tLbuis Reil broner,

;Forgl!1i ! p:nlted ,El.lr0J;?e: theSloifi !,!. the Eu.roEemOommuni ty,
N e'W York:
PublIc :APralrscomm t ee~ 19b1 " M."yne. 11[1.

-

!,'·Ibld.

19'

of Rome delivered thetWOeld<llt1ons to the Europelin Com..
. .'

.,'

. '.

munity :tn 19,7.
olol:t~'bl.tne

1

:for the 1rappea~ance on the t~urop$an scene t

Goodwill 14&8 high Qnd

'rQ~lco....oermQ1'l

pnoved due to sever5.1.c:ilr,o'.tillllst"noes
II
.. ..
,..

"

',.,.'

relationsr$pidly 1m-

l')rom!nen t illnong: ,these

"T"','

'-

'.

was the burial of the:;\PQ'l.:f~y 'ot GermQIl d18m~iliberzneht,
-""".:".-,.,.-;

Qocomplishecl by the settle,nlent of: the. oompetitlonqve~ the
,.

'.'

,

'

.'"

.

.

,

"

A 19$$ referendum by the SaaJ'land~r'8~eJecrtedboth

Ssar.

FrtHl0e and Europeanlzat:J.on1n :fliV'OX" of a return to GernuUlY;

1951 the Saar was

in

Republ1c,2

ortleially reunitf!tG w1tht.he Fe(i$rtitl

-Anothe:r contribution to Franoo.(}e:rm...n a,cn:rord

whioh appeared in 19.55wQ8 a decline in the fi-1ctlons which
h~d dev:eloped in

ing

ot

Eose •. 3The bitterness or the Gennan

rejection after the defeat

Q.coep'tfJS;r.lcftof Gernu~nY' into-NATO.

or

teel~

Eoo abated wi..th the

However,; with1.n NATO

it-

self &.nd soon within the nOj' issues evolved thit acted as
G

we'dge

be~ween

Fra:nceandGe1'l'l1.an1_

l'Wl111e,251,.

2Ib1d ., 208.

)P:r,.noe and GepmQnyt~mQJor issues in. dlsputeif1 EOSO
rates, divergent tax sY$t~ms,
indus trialenterprlse,'agreenients and ownershlp-mm il:gemen t
concentrQtion,~ll ot.whlch the High Authorityfpcoqpuring
the economic rec-eS$ ion. 0'£195.3. F. ,RoY-Willis t~elits. these
problems in detail 1nhieohapter "lturopean:l.SM in Decline,
1954-1955" (ErtitTIQe, GermQrl;Y:, Q~dthe~;ewE~~Qp~).
we:red~lsc1"1m1natoryfre~gh~

When GenerQl de Oaulle returned 'to power in. 1958

QS

President of the ,FltthRepubllc, he dec1dedto use the

instruments of fiTATOand the Europefin Commun1tyto tux-tiler

his gOQl of:restoringl1"rance to

Ii

great

pow~r

position.

The Fourth Republl0 had nllilde only pilrtlal advanoes t(')ward

fulfilling the objeot:tvesoutlirled. by

de Gaulle in

1945.

Through tb$ fr.nnewo.r-k ot the :ft1uroperm Com.rnunl:t.y it; had,' pro""

v 1ded .th.

bGS is

:reco"er:y"~b'uthQd 'fQ 11~

tor French eoo.nomic

en. to' supply FrQnce· sml11.t~.ry need, the barestbeglnning
hadibeen nuade to

cres~eam111tarily

Independent Ft-Qn(je •

A1 tbougb }f"'renQhmen bad beeniuuong the leaders otthfJ

t'wlotlo,nallst movement; the

Fou~th

RepUblic Is fnstabili. ty

ha.d not improved Frenoh. standing in other nations t

e$t~em.

Itrema1ned for Gen$;tJflil de Gaulle to take action which
would

~a18e }4""rar10e

to • position

or

world Influ.ence.

Be..

tween 1956 arld 1'963 the Fed~:rQl RepUblic ot Germar.ry
.figured v 1. tallY' in It''renehpol1c1es whloh 8imed Qt recove:r-

!ngfor FrQnce the st.tus. of
pendent, a

~eade%'

Q

greQt powe%t;fully- inde.r.

among the nations ot Europe .•

In Septembe:r 1958, ;}?r~81den t de Gaulle sent letters to
Brlt~1n

and the Un:lted stQtes

QndFrs:noe's role in it.

He

e,itpr~ss.1:ng
Sfii,W

NATO

».$

his views on :NATO

pasa~, ftu. struoture

formed to meet oonditions whioh no longer e.x.lst. tt to be

21
useful, rnodlfleat1ons would have to be lll~de.l
m~de

thr~e

c~i tioisl&S

De G"ull~

(l) th..- t importQnt de-

of NAT<)t

c 1s ions;\lJo;re Qll nUlae by the Un1 ted s'~,~teS(ln.~ Ore", tar1 taln I
JftJ%f

.

(2) that the geographic $oope of l'~ATOwas too limlted,an,d
<)

that Franoe did not

r~c,elv'e

a

fQl~sha:r~,.of

importQnt

p081t1ona :in the eomm~ndstruc:ture.2 In sho~t,.. to make
NATO aoeepta.ble to de afl1l11e, France would hav.e to l:>e.rully-

;recognized asa great power and
would mean being consulted on
ingQny area or the

quiring

~n

such.

treat~dQs

This

Qll,Westernpol-l~i~s

wo~ld, r~c~lvlng AmerloQn

regsrd-

fild11i8:C-

atomic stockpile <at lelitst to the txtento£

$uehi aid tloBri tam ).Ql'~d. being

glvenmo:r~

p.ositlons in NATO· $ COD,1mllnd .tr~~ture.l

and be'tter

A revamped I~ATO,

would have ~ . directorate of the three states having .world..
13r~ta1int

wide resporAelb11i ties (United States; Groat.

Franoe), and eaoh otth$.s$ states would h&vea

VQ.1c~1n

the

employment ot nueleaZ'weapons. 2

Frenoh desires stated in .the 1958 letter$were

r~

Jeeted 'by-President Eisenhower and?rime HlnisterMaoIiJ.:tllm
RhdGerm».ny, .w1 thth¢'other NATO oountries,

cr1 tlo1sing )'ranoe' sstand.3

De Gaulle f s d~sir~. to extend
fl.

lFurnlss, f'rQnce Qnder

jo:tnfJdlti

9c! Q~~lle,

10.

",.

'

2Godrre~1, 128.

3Roy c. M~orid.1s~ndBel'r1Qrd E. BrOl'tl, The De Gtrulle
¥9E~~;1j2~~Ol1ie1ol) od • l111nob % The Dorsey l-'l'ess .'no ••

22.
~!ATO's

geogr.phlc· ecope

w~s.

not

sh.re~

by most Germ,,-us

since Germany d1dnot have Franoe's oommitmentsabout the
..

globe..

1

Moreover" d,$ Gaulle t S proposed d1,:-eotox-.teo£fered

alpOS 1. tlon of equality to :£PrIne e, but, not to Gerrnany,2

Such German opposition provided
under4rn1n~:d

fJ,

source ofdlsoord

\vhic~

efforts to lilonteve that 1JItranco-Germliln rapproohe-

ment so important to de GQulle's strategy for Europeuin

leadership.
BaJ:ked of atta1ni'ng z-ecogn1 tlon

.8 .

~reat

NATO, de Gaulle took several itdd1t1onal ·steps.

power wi thin

Until an

•. g:reement could be reaohed on France' 13 propos.ls tor re-

vamping NATO, France would host no missile 'bases, would
join no unified air defense, and would remove its fleet
from NATO cont.rol.)

The American reaction in turn was to

place more emphaafs on Ge:rman contributions to J:.LATO; even-

tually le.ding. tQ to the very disruptive M-u.lt11ateral nuolear fo:rce disput, between France ind Germany.

The more

France 'wi thdrew from INA.TO, the. stronger the mill tar,. ties

bet-ween the United States and Germany became.

And oe1"tlinly

German'Y" s post tion as a dl'vlded na t1on, half-communist .nd
half-demoor~tle,

guaranteed the loyalty of democrQtlo West

Germ~ny to NATO.4

As GermQn-Amerlcan bonds tightened,

------------_
_--- _- _------510.
567.
.........

larosser,

.........

........

......

21b1d.,

3The Fourth Republic'had Rlso refused to
t.11r defense.

urilfy
(Jt'u.rnl$$, Fr~nce 1!rQubled ~lll' 41.f.6).

4arosser, 570.

~lelr

23
Franco-German relations cooled.
premise was that

the·~ecurlty

The

fund9ment~1

German

of Berlin 18 linked to the

Phy51cal presence ot, American forces» on ·Germ.nsol1; with
Amerlcantroops on the :spot, ony attQck would lmmeditately
involve Americana and force the United St.tee ,to prompt
aotion. 1

Suoh. view is quite the oppo~lte of the well

known~Ggull18t

desire to see Europe cleared of American

rorc~5.2

The military poliaies of Franoe and Germany drifted
further apart

8$.

de Gaulle con tlnued the Fourth Republic t!

program of an independent nuclear foroe.

On April 11, 1961

de Gaulle declared:
'~It 1. both the right and duty of the continental
European powers to h.ve their own national defense.
It i$ intoler.ble tor. great state to have its destiny
:!Subject to decisione and a.ct$
anoth.er at.te no
matter how friendly it may be."
.

oS

Though Germanyoould not be any more sure than Fr.nce
tha.t the United St.tee would risk retaliation from the

Sov~t

Union by using atomic weapons In defense of Europe, she did
not follow de

G.ullet~

lead, nor could

ahe~

Germany seem8

1 Ib id., 16)..,._

2Raymond Aron m.ke~ the interelJting point that de Gaull,e
accepts the fact that West Germany hee to contin.ue to trust
in American security,; thu3 he oan count on G~rm.ny Qnd other
Europe~n ~111ee to' $oothe. American feelings, lea.ving him
free to ~peak independently without fe.~ of losing Americ.n
protec tion. ("Reading de Gaulle' e r1ind," ~ Republi£,

CXLlII May

.

~

4, 1963, 1213) •

. . Hoffmann, 353.

~o

p:rete:r deper.'dena." on the Un 1. ted'

st,~ t..~s

on :Fri1tlce., if it OO!l'l~$ tQthat choice. 1

to dependence
Preferubly she

wou1d not c.re to b.Tor¢ed to m.k~ tb~t aho1c~.2
Sinee de Ga.ulle' .~. l?eturn to power;·the Fl'"'~,nch have
ernphas,lzed nu.c'l&ar we.pone., sUbordinating

c(t)nv~ntlon.l

Gep~ral~,t/hlln~ ,Chief of the F¥~nehAl1"

forces to them.

FOl'..~.j expressed th'eb~lli:t that • thre.t of' r:,uc"le".:X-w~lWpons
ag":i'f,lstconv~r~tlor.t.i att.ck. would oause" slowdown or even

e, stopping of the Att~:cl1.3
.::',','"

France o:r1tlclzed the growing

"',c.'",.-",,-...

.

','.

Germanemphlls1s on oonvIJntlonalwe8pous and France has
o!,f;t~cized

this not only-because it enlarged the German

!tH1.:11:t.rye~ tabllshmen~,but

also beeaus. ltrepres~nted •

giv:tng wa'y to Am.rio-ii pre·ssure.4

The Amerioan"'Oerman-

Frenoh trlan.gi. ol1~be 1••1.1801: nd.11 tarypolfcy 1sl. m. jor
$tu.rt1bling block 1n Fr.nd()~Germ..n relat1oDe&'.

Al though

deG,ull. ha.s refu,se¢! tooomprol1tlse his stmd on NA':PO, he

does not wish GermanY' to think that he rejeots the pX'inoiple
of the Atlantj.c .111ance.·

In May 1962; at

I- pr~ss

confez

l

-

ene., he r ••. r:Pirmedh1s b~llef in that pri:ne.tple~ .ssuring
his allies th.t.

"So long as tllt Soviets i;hreaten

alllance must be

m.1ntalned~

--_.- lGroaser,
'-"'"'-"'--"-------..-......'_
$68.
...........

this

----_.
58•

..............~

2EPstelnj

thel.vor~ld,

'France ls.n Int&gril part

.

_ .

,,~~ .......

.3Anthony Verriel'JtfFr~neh md West German strategic

Thinking;»

-

tIl!:.!

trJ0:r~l:1

4Ib1d ., 235.

'l'odll, XIX (J'une i 1963), 236."

If the fp •• wo:rld were attacked on the old

of it.

or

the new C9ntinen t, -Frllno.would tak@ part in the COltll'llOn
detel1$ft aX the sid.so! her .111'8, wi.'Ch all the means

she his."

De

"

vle-wsthe ttapproehement which he wishes to

G~ulltJ

.ncoul".ge between FrfHlce and Germ._ny primarily to further
Fr-.,nch national inter.'ats.The alos.x- the F'ranco-G0rm.arJ.
ties,the eGsler it :fsforJ"raflce tach.ok
powe~;.

1957,.,

As early as

It

rising Gerrrum

Kurt Si.v~kl:ng,. preslden t of the

Bundesrat', deal.e,reCit
It 1s $videtlt. that Germany will b~come.ev~rmor.

,th. natural nuc161.lsot crystal11satlonfor Europ.. • •
• It must b~ m.d~.apsolut.ly 01... 1' that. •• this..
. '. 1s t th. t1rst~,~v~Xlt of :fi;urope.'
'With G~rm.n aupP'C))iltF;r-lno. wou.ld b. in •• good poat tlon

to lead the Europea.nQommuni ty .long the pa,th$of French
pbliey.

The Comnl'un1tlwo~:.td httlp France become agp•• t in-

Indu'tp;i~l might was vit-Ito plaoing Frane.

dustrial pow&r.

in th. front rank

ofri~ti.dns.

It Bonn couldbepersu.ded

to .?cept Fr'ench nucl••r p6w.r in place of Artier-loan, F'ranoe
could tither ro~ce th.1>rATO
:revisions she d.$ir~d or
....
:--'
~-'.".

iVl"ly destroy:NATO

','

"."

.'.

b1;\,~.i,ktng out of

.:rr.et-

NATO w1'th Germttn'l.

As the leader Or"~;\1r():B., France could claim tht ;resouroes

of*-lmoat h.lfan industz-l 61 1 continen.t to h81p her st.nd as
• third force b,tw•• n the two world power bloos.

___________""'- . . ._'.*_'_t_.·._,
. lFrench E;;mbIlSSY,

Pr~s$

......

Prosident

~~-~

.....

~
~

and InfO:I*rnatlon Division, 'I'he

First Flve Y•• rsoftn.~F1-ttA a.Eubll~:.2! li'r.no,~,(N.w-YOrk:
Fv.noh~llssy,

2Kar1

w.

lC}04-r;-17.

neu tsch ~nd L$w1s J. Edinger, G.~m.n:y' ~!join}!

the Powers, (~rtanford:

~.-

-

Statnford Univers:1 ty :Pres 8, 19~9),

d. Gaull. openly

decl.,r.d~his

intention:

I lrl:tend to "persuad. the st. t.s to form .. poll tleal,_ .conomic, jii'gS;pat.gia blo'Q; to 8staPlish this
organization bet~".n~be Soviet and th. Anglo... /nner1o,n
c a m p s . l » .'
o~1.n te<,iW'e8t

A F:renoh

aorml,ny might eVen

8ncou~.g.

East European.s tt> loosen. tleswi"th the Soviet Union

b.

;rod

drawn westward bee-us.' they would no longerr•• r an arrned
,nd un! ted Germany. 2

Itw•• fortunate torP:resld.nt d. Gaulle that

th;$

h•• d

ot, th.'tideral a.pUblic of Germany, Ohancellor Adenauer,
also desired

rappro(jh.ment.

I

Adfbnaue:r wlsheda reoona111-

a t10n wi thPr.tloe IlsI)artof his basio po11(ry' of
ip@

8S t$b11sh.

conf1.dculce in Ge:rnUlny- by firm.ly .llylng he!' wlththe

"'has t.,.3

Th1"Qugh a PO$~;,i~o#ot power ga1netd by' •. 11gn1ng her-

solf wi ththe West,

ae,rmany

tiate for ':reunification.
:Frarlco"'G~:rroan

r(tud

WIUS

would be in;',. posltlonto :nego-

The burying

ot

the longst•.nd1ng

to b. the foundation

,or

tnew progress-

lveEurop•• 4 a.n.rlt~,f()t'W.8t Germany would'1nelud.~eon
omio advantages

throu~hth.

Community and .. usefulallianee

in case of an Am.r10.n ... Sovl~t accord oVer the, question of
G.rman unifioation.'
laa,.ns Joachim Morg.nth.u~ "Four Designs tor Tomorrow" s

Europe", Th.

!!!!

YorkT1m.s.~.g.z1n. (MI."

20odtrey, 1)0.

.3Ar~n, 164.

17, 1964), 18.

4Epste1n.58.

'Allin S. 'Nan.a, lttW.$.t G_;rman Foliey in W.st Europe,"

OurZ'ent Hlatorl., XLIV (April, 1963), 21$0.

'Durin.g

tn.

first years

or

d. Gaulle' sachnlnietratlO'n

F):~noo...G.;r.man .ru~~ordp.rosr.!H1UU~d

I,ppolntnt*nt ot

t~,.ur1c..

m•• tln@~

Tb. 1958

~/ltU'f~ 1.1.ltt"

1('r~A'o:h

d. (-tou". de

,p;mbas$ador, to German1 •• s

g~$ttl~..

tHJtterlot·orl1y.

l~or.l~

l/sJ.n1etlltr w,sftn auspioious

Jh'19n~u"v took! t .. 8 a good orA~~h 1

ot

Adenauer

.-f:l"

·thon

d. a1ful:l.) it

Af't.x- tll. first

'b1iHH,m~ ol4t_~r

tb"t thfll

two h ••de ota't.teshtr_dmutual .dm!'ratlon ror .ach other
'as1Jell •. $ In

.w.~cen"·$~

oooper.tion. 2
m.t.1c~lll.

t.tlt1oo to

F1"'ilineo-(~h~p[ft"n

f:'tconomlc In,t..,gJ?atlon adV.llo_d -lrnost .uto-.

By 19$8 tl1• • arly dlspute'$ w1 thin Re,se wor.

upbQldth.T'~fl.,tl

tlotmton ,~:~A:rk.t _.3

eupp().rt of

o'fth. adval1 tagea ot

cr

aom.md1rrjI,1~'mt.ntth.

Dlplomati('fall1.,

'th.G.rm.r~po.lt10tl

'&rif/;

Frenoh pres ld.nt t 5

tn S.. r11n and his oompll..

mtt11tat'1 sp•• eh.s publlefilly pr.l",lng Germany and

;'d.n~u.r

contrrlbuted to 1rnprot'lng ~.l.tlo-n. b.tw••n the two countrl.s.4

Tholl' tt8p!)J'ocrulfm.llt waa

cll!~x.d

s~.lce~88tu18t.t& "lett.

in 1962.

b1 .n «Yxcha't"4g. 0,t vflr1

80 successful w.:r. tb. 1962 tttatt: vlsltm thl·t French

trod O.rman aoe1,,11at p.rtl.sbaoe::nf< alltl't'fted enough to issue
• j01tlt -w4l:rnine;.
1W11118, 276.

1'hey

r •• r.d, th-t

2notftnfUTo.

the

r~cono111.t!on

was

34"'.

~W.ltfU~.Zt.hl (ed.), ,Ii!\t !rQ11.tlce off'oa t~.. r .9!!rrt)!t..r~X
rork: Freder!(fk cA. t':c•• ger, Ina.,L9m;
4\/111118, 294.

28
becoming an allianoe b.tw••ntwo

n.,t1on.11sms.~ .1m~d

at ..

P .Iris-Bonn •."-is which would dom!nllt. an integra,ted Europ_.
Insp1te of Ad.nllu(l)r*s,h.'tt.uj d.n1 •. 1~; which appflllr.d in

Chrlatund

~.lt

on S.pt.:mb.r

14.

a•. ull.' s

1962,d.

consis-

ten.t rejection of supran.tio:nalisffi lent 8u'bsta:nc. to th.'
chll,rg_.

W'ith.out th.$upr••n.tlon.l.8p.ct~ th.Oomr.uunl ty

on

uldb. lim! t.d to depending

W'J,

oper.t1on,l

t~ .. d1 t1.ooa1

or

The Franoo-German .Tr•• ty

na tionaloo-

1963 w•• oritic-

ized by sonte Gorman Qpponen,ta pr.ci,s.ly on the grounds

that 1 t e.nteredon a Bonn-P.r1s •. 111ane.inst•• d of the
unity 01:' theS1x. 2

It

"".8

to b. th.

m•• neot 'otun..ntlng the

Fr ehoh-G'erman rela tlonshlp through c 10,$. cooperation.
4

h ••ds of gov.rnment m... t at l ••ost tw10e • y.ar.

Wh.

th. d.r.nm.

ministers every thr•• months, th. ohi-fa of staff every two
months.

These 001'ls'ultat1ohS

(lOV'lr

fore1gn • .rraJ.. lts,

.oonomic • .fforta,youth and eduoation..)

tr••,ty

WA.

d.t~ne.j

a.oeptionot' the

divldtd.lxl F:rana., th. Ootrmlunl$ts a-lied 1 t

'''~.m.gogu.ryn,

th. Socialists clalm.d it Was

tn.••ningless

UJ,'11sss d. GaUlle controll.d both Frane. and Germany, and
th. mod_rat.a d.ploredit ... 8 bae.d on .. bre.k with Britain
lind the Unit.d

Stat.s,,4'

lFurnlasj Franc.! Un~.;-

s!!

G.ull.

p

'

49.

2Wil11sj 312.

~1.Jclm ,Faokl.r. ttThe p'ranoo-O.rma,Il Tr•• ty:

hereditary

.mnlty,~

4Wl111s,

34.

the .nd of

World Tod8l, XXI (Jlnu8ry, 1965), 28,

29
Adonlluer _,nd the men who su.pport_a hiI'll wore llbled

German aaulllsts.

It,14a$ proof of the high pr10rltythllt

Adenauer placed on good Fr.n.oh rttl.tions that h. rat_d th.
.n~ry

treaty abov. B:rlt..in 'e

1nt,o EEC.
,~

fl. looked on th.·

.c,cord as • m••nsof'pr-aerving'lth., rapprochltment wlthFranee
.

)

pa.st the time wh.n h.wouldturn the ottice ot' ohanc'el1or

But the rujorltY' ot aerm.n opinion

over to someone els ••,1

EEe CommiastQn Pr.e1dtnt Hallst.• in claimed

w,e:s<)pposed.
Ita~bot.g.d

th.splrlt ot' the Treaty of Ro~. by" fts·'bl-

llt-ral natur. rath.r$ban
,

.

•

USillg'

th. Oommun~ty fr.un"work. 2

.

,Th. French veto of Brlt'·l~ ,took placo only &w••k b.fore

Ad.tllu.r* s visit to F.rls·~~.nd th. aerman chanc,.11orrC9c,,1v.d
shat:p eritlclsxrl ,r:or signing th- tre.ty i.n· th_
F;'-'at1oe' s

r.ce ot,

r~ j .:0 tlon otl~1'1t.:ln.3 'lb.. tv.at,.· W.~8

only-rat t1-

fj,edbec.tuiJ. 1. t eouldb'us.d as • mod.l for-mult11.teI'al

coop.ration with oth_x-

t-h.G.rmans add_d

It

eo'Ul'ltr18s.4

pr•• rtlbl. which oall-d

co(;rp.r.tlon b"tw••n tb.Unit.d

st. tes

d.r.nsa in NATO withlnt_gration

th• • ntranc. of Gr.at B:rit6n.
'.

F.ckl.~,

or

tor clos.

and Europo, ,corrmlon

member,. arm.dforces,

ot Europ• • long Commun1ts,. lines, including

end unification

1

B.tor.-AOoepting,it,

26.-

Thus th. Bund.svat sp.l1od

2Willis,
',"
312.

4Alfred Grauer, The Federd
(N.wYorkt Frederick A." Pr •• ger,

3Wl111s, 309.

ae~Ubl,lC .2.!,.Ge:rmllnz
19 4), 120,

3q
out th. issults W:11oh divided

op.ning lin.s of

~TJ.nc.

and Oerrru"ny in the very

treaty-meant to 'symboliz. olos. oooper...

II

• tlon. 1

The terms

or

nhatr•• ty are being o.rri.dout.

Th.

for_lgn arfairs conferences b..v. tak.n :place as perscrlb.d
but not much in th. w.y of oommon pOlioy has resulted.
PrGsidentd. G.ulle t s crt tleisttl of NATO 1l1,sunde:rmlned ohances

or

olos.:r,' d.r.na. po11oy.2

Only in th• • rel of youth and

_duoa'tlon h.$ there b.en what could b- o.ll.d eucc.ss.

On-

evldtne. of thl8 success 1s th. rae t that in 196'+ ov.r
279,000 youth.s hav_ crossed 1m. tront1.ra both wliys.

But

art.r six months. ev.n d. GaUlle" when sp•• klng o:f tn. t:r••. ty,

acknowl.dged that "this proj.at, .v.ryone knows, has not

oom. to anything. f~.)

Th. ..rly

',"1 ft lira that h.ld sO

much hope fot' Franco-

G_rman diplonlllcy look.d just as .ncourliging for th. Europ••n
Eoonomic Oommunity.

Living up to 1ts .arly' promis., th.ttEC

acted •. s • stimulus to eoonoll11c growth in, France and Germany.

a.tw••n 1958 and 1962

35"

and P'rench 2.3%_

'M"rk.t partn.ra
tr1pl~d.

Germ.lln industrial prod'Uotion climb.d

Fr.nch and German trad_ wi th Oommol1

do~bl.d..

whil. Fr.noO.,;.aermlin trade tlltrloet

Oollaboration betw••n Frenoh and a.:rman industry.

t.king th. form

08

lic.rlsing agr.,nu@lrd;s, mark_tins; _gr••mente,

_------

~~,.,...--~~-"""""--'
.....

lw111iS, 313.'

.lind joint 8ubaidiarl.e, markedly Incr~.s.d.;.l German rai th
in

Fr~neh

ll'ltontlons to l1v. up to th.

of .Horn.e r~c.iV8d

~'1'.Ulty

of the

boost during EEC's tiret YOQr by P'r4inee '8

Q

m~kingsaerlfie.s

't~rms

to m•• t th. first tariff de&dll11..

In

order to m•• t th. schedul.d 10% tariff'r.duotion for all

Em

oountriea by Januery 1.. 1959,radic4ileconornle r",forms were

r_quired in F1rsno_.

D. Gaulle m.t this n •• d by

the .franc, r$nJ.ovi-ng quotss on

90% of

Fr~nc.ts

d.v~1'UQt1:ng

imports" from

OEECeountrifls, In¢r... slng taxea, euttltlg ex.penditures; &rid
1.ow.rlngsoc1Ql security paym.nts.,2
the Common Msrket

s.~m.d

Ind•• d, iiu:fu.r.-nce to

to signify thQt Franc. was _rlding

QtrQdition ore-nti_ring her 1ntec;rnatlonal economic policies

. on domestIc pX'-otection!sm.

Most of: the opposltiontoEEC

cQm.rJ:'onl indus-trt.ssuch a$ th. Frenoh textil. industry
that feared comp.ti t1on~1th other Oornmun1 t1 nQtlorls Qftor

tariff reduotions came Into

.rract.

Eneour$lge1.ngly, th_

EEe justifi.d lts.lf to th. Pronch textil. industry by showing ., jump in 1 ta px-oduotlon ind-x from

95

in 11,59 to 118 in

1963, using 1958 a8 a bas. YltaX' of 100.3
Although friotions :tn:Uo ox1sted from the start, they
did not becom. evident until th. oommuni ty was WCtll under"wfil.y .. " OVl»rt ditrerenc.s I1PPfHU".d on li1Qtt~rs of tariff r ...

duotlon, common ,,-griau.ltu,rQl pollcy, politic&ll
m.mb~rship for Grlturt Bl."l tQ1n .}.f..

unlon~

HQvlng b ••n refused a

and

rr••

---~--------------------,--------.......-..---,----

lWl11iS, 2e.l.

2!~~q.,2-78.

-

4Ibid .,

282.

32
zon. wlthEEC memb.,rs, Brit&lln org4l,ulzed th. Eur"OpeiUl Fr••
D~nm~rk,

Trade AssociGtlon (EFTA) with

Austria, Portugal, Qnd SwitzerlQnd to
nl&et this ch9,11enge
Fr~nc.

reg.D.c·tions.

Horwsy'" Swed.n,
COInl;H.to

d.cid.ed to acoererQt.

]~1~C

wi

thEE~O.

To

its't~rift

favo:r*d this step; aermany, slwQYs a•• k-

ing wider n18rk.ts, 0pPQsedi t~ in the .ndtth.y oompttomised.1
HQ.d

not the 1nteriortarifts b ••n roduc.d and

t.r'fo:r

tQr~ifr

cprnmon .x-

b.lJlu agr••dupon, EFTA might ha"'. 'had'" great...

toott.r WI1t$t Germany thatl th.

,_r"tl?Rding QdVanitage

:munlty,.

it

In that! 81 tu~,~'j,()n the F.d..ralaepUb.l,!oml,ght'w.l1

hRY,'., ,bel&o drawn :to 8e:Los.~ aeoord with Britain.

.rlo;ti~h to

.

:~" ..-: :';

,

:

"

:,

'

':

~.":' -'

Ins~.Qd

h1Br1t,all1.2

prevent OorlTlanl b.lng led aatr81

, The EFTA

by

Oom~

.

-.

- - '.

- ',',

'

'

d1s0ord,-·'h>1~light.d th. d:t:ft.r~ntplin$ f~vor$d

Fps:rlce and G.rmtiny.

Wll,.

h.neh endors.d c8.r.ful /plann-

In.g;~ndd.v.lopm.nt wi 'chIn:< the S1x) and opposed th. c'ompllc-

$itlons brought on bY' Iherejs1ng th. s1z.otthe Community.

ErhQrd,as

SpOk.Sll'UUl

tight plQnning
.

AS

ofthi Oarman .oonomlc group.

Cornrn:uni$tio and boclli.ua. 1 t sh.ut Sri tleh
.

and Amer1canxnark.ts toG.:rman goode.)

terms

.$

·'Europ.4ln incest"

&".n

H.

rLlbld., 286.

3Gro EHiflr, "Franoellnd

us_dsuch

a.nd tt.oonomic absurdi ties'·

describe th. French m•. rk,ting outloOk.4

-

1"0 j.ct~d

G~rnlanY', u

J"'Wolfe tv. Schms,k01, ftaftrmfl.ny

572.

~ndth.

nommon

Curr.nt Histor:y, XLV (Nov.mber, 1963), 285.

to

.J3
Proba,bl:r the moe t difriettlt

~conomlc

stum.bling block

in F:E1C was th.., oommon9_griculturQlpollcy, th. 'lUllS tfo:r
which b$g~n in Januat·Y' 1962. 1 Wi th .IDQst G.;.rnl~.ny (th.

natur-a.l proouc.x-

or

~gricultur~l

p:rodu~cts

I·or West

o-.,~m~ny)

cut off,France- $ surplusasrioul tU!'lil.l produce would find
a natural !nark.t in

food~d.tiol.nt irJ$$t

But

a.rtrlQny.

GellmSiny's l.ss .rf1ci.nt tarnl popul,tlon enjoy.d a pro-

tected position in ih. West C.h,rmQrt economy. 'This prot.otlon
was due to' the powerful voice

md Ge:rmany had *stabllsh.d

or

tht farm vote.

.l.bo~at.

'~T~no.

subsidy systems
itlt.rn~l

d.licllt.ly balanc.d tneaoh country's

Both

*conomy.

In

ord.r to enable EEe to begin its s_ooxld stag. on tim8 in

January 1962, G.rmGny made tn.jar oone.salone in agriculture,
doing away with quotas, govern.mc.nt stoc,t(piles,

tUld

national

Po~k,• •ggs Qnd poultry W8re to

tariff bQrri-rs j.n ct:r.als.

b. p:rotetlted by 1.v1.s and

~

minimum prioe whlch

to th*, c-r",g,ls agr••m.nt~

Anoth.-:r agricultural sa,cri-

tl'U.mbor st~t.s.

The other mtlmb_rs

eoa t of thcrr contributions whieh
Q.

tifJQ

op.~

<llJOtliS ,for wilute

or n:mc

r.eogniz&d the

fie. Gft;rnumy mAd. WQ8 Qn8.grcunnent to

to

w~rfl!

a,,:rmany was milk ing and

88

rl'isul t th-y too wore willing to n'J,fik. eOl1.c_ssiOllS whioh

would.• 58. th6 organlzat1on t $ progr.ss. 2
~h.r.

on.a.

were pollt1c.al ditf.ren(HIS as

Although the EEC had only

b.g~~

w~ll

88 .oon.om1c

funotionll1g in 1958,

r~d.r4)l,11st

groups soon urged a oombinat1on of the High

Author! ty 'wi th the Oommissions of l1lura tom tmd 'BEe iind th.

direot -l.ctlon of th_Europ.litl1 I~&rllam.nt.1In the f€itco
otth1st.ndency th. President of th. FlfthRepublic mad.
cl.~rh.

could n.ot 8.0cept anything that woUld :tntring. on

,

,

'r-Ilobnil tlonal sov4r.lgnt,.

Instead, in Octob.r

1~~9 i

P:r,m1.r Michel Deb.t*'sugg.$hd that th..' 81xllold p.r-fbdl0
¢onit".r.notls' on poll tic,l nil. tt.rs and. $stllbJ.+sha pol.t~loQl
.

';,',

$.~~it.:rl·at in Pa'r1s t ,;·Although th. EECt paI'~n.~s' wj,r*sus-

I11~¥#uS 91'

1m

at hmp t\'~~7~d.rll!ln. th41

COIllln~l.ty:, s u1~img t.

go.~}or ~11mlt.d tun(it1Ql'~8)':but r.al pow.rs,'f,tht,. Qgr~,d to

q);1i##,,~J.Y Ill. . t ing.. t t()~.lgn
(>

on ;:~t:~l1'lgn po11el. 2

,

min.1i!lhl'l!l .to

1',oonl!lu~'t;~t;:1on

-

.

'Xh.: po 11 tloa.l 1$,~.::"~fl:$ not an 1tern ofmomel1td1Jn1ng

1Il;l,.l'!rost stag. of

~'(£~*8"'1962)

i

but th.l'•. wllll nodouot

of~b..p.d. Gaull. stoQd'rigard1ng 1 t.

In at't-lev'1$_d

8p.-~'¢h t.ri tJI-.y 1960, h.~<bll1.1.(l foxt .. w.s,~.rn.Etu:-op.Qn,Unlon
Qsjn 'f imposing conf.ao'vaAJ1,on" which 'W()ul,~ b 91.nce }f;listem
".;',;,'V

".

" ,

"

: . ; , ,.

:

Europe tand. male_ possibl,•.aEurop.an .nt.nt*.'f.fromt-h.
tctliirltif)- to th. U2'9,1$_"

In. JurJ,e otthtt yefi1r·,Debr'.x-

plAlltl.dthat hanc.eU.driot cons1d.r meJ?ging, the Comrnunity
4Jxecu.tj.v4tS nec.ssary ,sinc. Qnly gov.rtltlHitntooop.rtii tion
W4fS

ntHtd.ed. 3

Th. Freneh governm..nt co:n,sidered the present

Community structur. tight enough

~rld

any further cohesion
4 . . ,-

~ ...... -~

n •• ded could come frolnr.glilar gov'ftrnm.nt chann-ls.

A

th1.:rd tim. in th. saUlS yflar,.t his September $pttoas eon-

t.j.nc., d. Gault. lnad.el«uIP tihat h1svision of unlt_d
E:ut';o.p. w.sbas.d on sOvor-olgn

community,l
.N' ev.~tl'+.l.ss,

in ap1t- of

st~t.s"

d.

not a sU'pranatlonal

Gaulle' a dIsapproval,

v.:ritious proposi,ls torf\1ttther1ng poll tiC8l 1nt~gra1;lon were
mad.. to th- Study" Commlssl,on .atilo11shed

b9~P;O.

As the

Oomm.on f-iarket mov.d. intOfts El4tcondph$,se, cone.mav.r its
d.Y.loptrJ.~nt

b.esm. rnor• • out,.

or

;$u.ggoat*d tht formation

The Fr.nch gov.rnm.nt

a council of h.,.dtJofstat. having

pow o:rswhleh would reduOsthe rol. of theOommul'llty Ass.ml~aul ..H.nrl

bly.

$paQkof Belgium. :vtj_oted this proposal

19n(ionoa mor- urg.d t'h.ftl.rg~r of • .x.outiv.-e. 2

Thelssua

,nd.d. in d••dlock in th*,March 1962 m•• t~n8·Or for.lgn
m1nist.rs.
Another difficult is!ru. on the study OOrnmiss1on t s
~.g.hd.

was th. problem ofEri t1sh -m.m'bereh1.p in EFJO .•

In July 1~61,Prl:m. ~tlnl$t..r Harold»-iaamil'1an '.n"
.

."

.

.

.

nouno.d the Gp,n1ng ot'll.gotiat1ons torSrltlsh.ntr1 'into
E:gO, .which th. EECCommlsslon gr•• tttd war-rol"

Th.N~th.·r

langsj B'lgltun. Luxembouvg, Qnd Italy .sp.cielly w.lcomcd ..

pot,.ntlijl count.rbalsnc.to a Bonn-Pltr1a axis; and Gormany
w~s

»180

plm~s.d

1 19M _, 295.

at th. prospoct of Britain joining :REO.

It would b.

Iii

a,nd pr8se,nt »

further consolidation' o.fth. W.stern
mor~

~llianc.

solidly tthi t.d west.rn, .front to the Sov1.t

G,.rrn~ny alr~.dyh~d .. eonslder.:bl• •mount oftrad.

U:nio.n.• 1

with Sri tr;1n end this move would .nl;,J;'g_ tha.t mar:ket .v.n

mor.,

Co.mp.tl tion with EiFTA WQuld end Qnd most of its

rorm.r membars would' become _ ssoeia t.
providing Y'fttw1dermarkets. 2

m.mb~rs

or

EE:C tnus

Pr.nc. b.Qwev$r was 1*88 en...

thu.slastio sino. she was not 1ntfU'Jest.d in trsdewi thth.

British Commonwealth and f.lt she hId littla to gain from
aca~pti:ng

EFTA memb.rs &,sJ!rEC associates'.

N.verthelsss,

Is negotl&tlons w.ro .bout to begin, President d. Gaulle
stat-a that h. had Ualwfiys dos1red that others, Qnd G:r••. t
Bri tftin in pAlrt1eul",r', .OC1Jpt the Tr.aty. of Rome. tt,3

By October 1961,-

.8 negotiations

tor British entry to

FUOO beg8n to tak. rorrn,the numb4rr of concessions n ••ded

tOilccomodat. the probl"ms ofConmlQnw.fal thtrl.de b.c,une
I,ppillrent,

Sargaining continuod into »1.1 1962 wh.nth.

serious hurdle of th. stand.l'd.s und.r whioh t.xuperat.

t"ood$tuffs would .nt_r the Oornmon' 1'1ar'ket, wh.r. they could
cOnlp.te w'i th French produce_, wa.. taek16d;this problem r.mtllned unsolved.4From Ootober to Dec"unbar 1962, ntttgotl.,tiona dealing with d:tr.otBr:1tlsh sUb$ldl~s and gUtirsnt•• d

---------,-""----_.

......

"'--,"',.,

..

~.--""'----,-----.,...."

lTerencGJ Pritt!., nTh. P_rie-Bonn A.Xis,

eXLII! (Fobru.ary, 1963), 9.
2Willls.. 300.

3Ibid ., 307.

!~~biq.,

~.w 116pUb!.!,£,

301.

p;rtic.$ iti Qgrioul ture v ls"'!,l-vis the
poltQyb$o1Jme d.adlock.d,which

ElSe

corrtmon a.grioul tura,l

rH"e.ssi,t~ttid

th... ppoint-

mst1t of a faot find1l'lg oom11iitt•• ) ;)ut Prfts,1d_nt d« Gaulle

, put an end to th. discussion wh.n he announced to • press
conferano_ on

J~.nua:ry

14,

196.3, that" in his view, B!'itain

w&lsnot r®ady for entry into lEO and in fact did not fit

into the' Europ.an pictur_.
,n.got1Rtlons tor Sri t • .1n t

A,w•• k'lat.r,Frano. moved tbat
, 1
adxn1ttanoe to EEO b• •ndtd.

$

I'

~j,.

.rr.at

F;renoh baX'rlng of Sri t.1n from

on Franco--Germah rel,tions.

E~1J

bad Ilv1.o1 ..nt

:publlc 9plnlon polla

in Germany reflect.dth.dx*as'tiechange 1n G_rman f •• lings,
German raltot1on to Fr.nch for.lgn poliey' dropp.d from 61%

:ravorable in. Oetc.fb.r1962 ,to 38~ in l~ov·.mb.r 1963~2

attrma.ns .r*lt InEfult.d that th. Fr.nQh
w._lt~d

pr.al,~.nt

h3d not

even on. w.ek, th. tim. that the C;.rman chancellor

would b- inPa:rls toslgn th. Tr•• tf of

19~';,

to oonsult

'hinlon ,. illatter of: such 1mport.nt mutu.al Int'.. ;r.st.

There

the:re was bitter r.s.ntment against Ad.nau.x-forhavlrig
signed .. treaty in th. t .. ~~ of d. Gaulle t:l indepond.nt

action which
t.tton

tn.

th.ttl. tt.r

$ •• mod

a betrayal

or

th. spirit of consul-

tr•• ty was supposed to r.pr,.s.n t.

or

As1d8 from

national prl<i_. Gertllan businessm.n and in-

dustr1ltllsts b,118>v-.d

tha~ Ft-~no$

had

• conotnie advantQg.s otBri.tish •. nd
,.

l~Nillis, 302.

'.1sAW

d~prlv.d

thom ot th•

Oonm1onw.~lth

mark.ts.

Wha.t caused de Gaulle to deal such e blow to' his care.fully nurtured Franoo..,Garman rapprochement?

The safeguard-

ingot French agrictlltural lntereets was not the only,; not
even the pr lmar-y, res.son for

)'trance '

s re ject10n of Bl'i taln ..

De Gaulle did not wish to see Great Bri taln in JJ;EC because

Br1ta1nwould be a way tor the United states to In.fluenc&
and possibly threaten European independenoe,
.p1cions

His sus-

ot American plans to use Br1tain as a Trojan

horse were aroused by the assurance given by President
Kennedy to Prime .Minister" Macmillan thattbe "speoial

relationship" between Brltal11 and the United states would

not" be changed. 1

The United states thought thttt Brit&~n

would glveEEO greaterstab111tYt an Atlantic outlook, end
a pos! tlol'l more in line w1thAlner1can views on m.aJor issues.2 .

Press releases, such

88

the fQllowl:ng, convincingly implied

that the Un1 ted States 1n tended to use Sri ta.fn

8S 8

mad.!a to

dominate the Oommunity:

A Plurope oxYganlzed wi'thout the United States would be
a Europe organized agairlst the United states. This 18
why Weare push1ngbard tor joining the Common l~larket.
• • •. We njed Britain as a broker end to ensure an
open door.
.
.
.

It 1s likely that de Gaulle did n.ot want Britain to enter
the Common plarket as a .full member during 1 ta forma tlve

lMa~ ~~loft,
Unite4 S~.tee and the Unlp: of ~f:\ro£!
(Washington, D.a.:'he 13rookIngs InStItutIon, 96J), 101.

The

-

2 Ibid •

3Ibid • 109.

-

political per1.od.

Only atte;r Franoe has been able to shape

and set the form of El00

-for de Gaulle.

W01.l1d

S:x-i tls.h. entr&noe be feas.able

co~~

5.1nee the

c

of the vJe$tEuropean unif'io-

atlon was to be Bonn and paris, de Gaulle would prefer not
toh$ve aaompetl tor -of: equal strength to balecnoeli"'ranee
wi thin the commun 1 tYt·1
.

"

-,

ot cou:r'se there were more factors

in the oooling

Fre.noo-Germao relations than the Frenchretusal to allow

Britain to enterEEC.

Ii. new chancellor began leading the

Federal Germerl RepUbllopo11oy a:nd placing emphasis. on
othe~

goals,

Even greater divergencies or-policy were

develop1ng in BEe and NATO.

'rench natlon$llsm found tm

echo: in Germany, and-Sonnano. paris developed different

piotures ot Mosoow•

.The first conferenoe between Pves1d.entde Gaulle and
Ch$~cel1or 1P.1rhard in July

1964 wal notausploious.

~he

:Freri'oh president announc'$clthat they had sp<>k:erf with "extreme rranKrlSss", and1t\iuis leaked to the p~~ss that

de

G$ulleorlt101.edE~hard·s support

ot

theArtle:r-1oti~polioy

in '-~~uthea$1'; Asia .1~on:.lder1ng Erhard' $- statements
Bund~et'e.t

in October
I

196j~$

ot state was not surprisIng.

in

the

ooolness betweerithe two heads

tt.The security of
. the Federal
-

German .Republic can be guaranteed only through NATO;w1th

thecooperatlon at

OUJ:'Eu~0peQn

end Noz-th Ame'rioan pB.%'tners

1nboth poll tical and military fields,·l he had stst'ed.
1~ak1ngeV'en moredefln1teWes~ German

Uhlt~d

comm1 tment to the

States, Erharddeelared thet h1sgovernment .would

con.tinue nto decide
I

al1qu~stl()ns

or

common- interest in

close and friendly eonsultatio!l with t:q.e Ame:r1can government; n he 8.1so vJ:tshed to reopen r:.egotlatlo:ns for Brltl$h

:4tpinoers on h"rhard, rt The r~conomi8t, OOXII (July 11, 1964),

132.

4~,:

Entry into EEe, and to work tor a "wider Co111tUunity.ul
'Ear,liar

dltferenQ,6~within

rJA'I'O had. not $bated by

196,3, and it was

madecle~:rthat

ofwlthdrawal.

De Gaqlle predicted tl?-at; by 1969, ttWe shall

F;ranoe w8a1n the process

end the subordination that is described 'as il1t$gpatlon,
whioh 1sp;ro,v1dedfQ.l:t 1.>y W'.A11 0 and

:i.ntne hands ,ot .fo~elgner$...2

whic~ put$OUI'

dest;lnl

To th, contrary. the Federal

Germ.an a.publio l'¢newe<.i its 1018.11;1 tQ NATO and this added

to the Frenoo-(le;rman

l"lt~,

For eXQmple. Erhard accepted

the ML!''' 3 ,s a means to further Germarf md,.litary l:nteg,ra,tlon
intoth..e Atlantic alliance, e,ven though., suoh integration

w.Qs a direot blow to de GaUlle fa vi .i,on of an independent

Europe. 4

It did not wQrtnrelatlons between thelrtwQ

c01xntries when tiPhard.ennounced that while he ttraspeot$u
th.e French n"uolear tore~.he "feels more 8Jecu~e~' under
the Amari (Uln • S

As Bonn fottg$(l etronger bonds between West Germ.fffiY
and the Un! ted Statesbysueh linksaa ML'I de- Gaulle deolded to ule

E~EO

•• one means of applying pr5Seure on Erhard,

.,...,.,.,.

:lW111is_ 316.
2ttDe Gaulle.8 }{:urope," Am~r1ea,OCIII (8epternber 25;

196~) I.

308.

3f1iLF represents multilateral nuclear force, &. .fleet of
surfaoe ships arl'rlEtd wi t'hpola:rl $ missiles and operated by

mixed~m&lned

orews from NATO oountries.

4"The Oeneral Picks. His Sattlefield l
OCXIII(N'ovember 7" 1964>, 592.

5."...1..

lrold Him"

997,·'

,

(Willis, 321).

"

The Economist,

_. ·

rrhe 1'1eonom1st.... CC!X (December 7; 1963.1,

---"

pa~t1eularly through the issue

or

grain prioes. l

Always

a thorny problem, agricultural policy was the first major
hitch in EECafter Erhard took

o£.flc.~.

De Gllul1e wIshed

to have a solid i'·uropean agricultural fI·ont to present to
the UnIted States at the Kennedy

FtOUIld

of Tariff

stions which waa 5ch$duled foX' spring 1964. 2

negotl~

P:rogress on

reaching EEe agreements on agrioultural products was slow
during the summer

1963.

In October 1963

t~t 8. d~ciB1on

timatum demanded
qu~tEEC.

of

Q

French ul-

be madf) or FX-aIlce would

F'1ns.lly 1n December. 1963 some mutual ooncessions

permitted a common po.llcy-to be drawn up lnbeef; milk
i

p:rociuets'Qnd r1 be, buto,(t;t.·:tal deo1elons wer$ posiipori$Q

until April 1964.
dup;C'j

1s

more significant When it 1s l'ea112HJd ,~hJlt,,:pro

duets have more
'.,

The aooord reaohed on 'beef and1'rll),.k pro-

va~u.,:·~:c!: .'~re.ter
-";.;'

-'.

CottlmdnMarket 1 a
bull dina, and

':',.':

,.:",.-"

produetlontn.an all·'the

."-:':,',:.,::,'

mfjtal~o:rltl~g industriaa. i:nc,ludlng

'l'u tomobl1e'rtta#ufac 'Cur 1ng.

8nip.

Jan Utx~y·· 1_1970

We.~'l,~e'ba8 thetQrgetq~te by wh1ch ell' prioe's t46uldbe

(jl1.~ed.

Arriving at'. GC6trbon price, a specific taX'g'et

da.te and the meat!. to ach.lev$ that goal requires slow and
palti~ taking

\f±c~;~#atUln

negot 1& tiona.

in 00 tobe l'

1ftDlplomatlc
.\1.7'+,
. (!}6 J·) 684
.' '. ••

However. France $a.sued I).nother

19.61li.~h1'ea tening

~1an~..,J~~~,4;
Nell1
. " .....,.< -

the t

t1rl~~a l!I

'llhl!!'

Statesmen, LXV,I!;(Bchr.e$\"Iel'

43
ag~icultu~al

comtnon market, developed on schedule, France

would walk out). 'In De'oamber, Germany conceO,ed in part' be-'

cause the other lEO partners

ooneider~d'rancEJt1;1'

demand.s

on cereal prioes legltlmate.
Though compromise and OOl'lossslon might work out· dirt!...
culi economic difference. wi thin

E:a:~,

polt,tleal

dirt~zt

The idea. that de Gaulle'

anoes remained irreconcilable.

would ecuttle the Common it'1arket ove:rthe poll tical issu.e

:Q.asbeend1soountfJd by some.
deeply

l~teg:r8.ted

French economy had become

into' EECdur1.ng ita first s 1xyears.

The draft ot the tifth French economic plan (1966.1970) was
based on the assumpt10fi.'otEBC development.

Halt France' $

tra,de outside the f:ranc ares. 'ia (,Hil'rled on 1n EWa, and she

was the greateat

bel'leticiar~., 'ot

cul:t,uralpol.lcy.2

the Comnt.on Market's agr1-

De Gau.lle hlm$slf lnApr11 1964 announced

1;hat tiLt ;tleby 11 ttle the,!uropean QOrrl$on Ma,l'ket is beco1l'l-

1nges$en tlal to ourprQ.perl ty. t.t3

On the other hand ..

de G8.l111e hat' never indioated ths.'b he would sacrifice one

of

h18~ajQX-

goals,nat1onal 1ndepen4enoe,

tQ1J

$oonoml0

advantagt.
Juat as the issues qf, Sri tl«tb, membershl',: and. agrlculturelprlcin,g had d1vl(.t~4'".:<!~ Gaulle and Erhard, 1n 1965
ltlThe General Picks Hia Sa ttlef1eld, ,. ,91"

~Godfrey. 12,.
3Willls, 314 .

poll tical development becaTa8 the topic of debate.
thl~d

or

stage

The

E»;O maturity was due to come in to being in

1966 and hinged on major steps towaz-d politieal integraMajolllty voting, whioh would end national vetoes,

tion.

ultimate

pa~11amente.r1

control ot EEe funds; direct elec-

tion otthe Parliament; all these measures embodied the
5uprahatiotlal na.ture otEIC thai de Gaulle denied. 1
.

".,'

D.Gaulle,

.t'

Autl'lor1 ty and

a countermove; p%'opoaed th.at thfJHigh
the:~

Oonun1;as1one tor iura tom and REO be aom-

"

bined but wi th eon.$lderabJ,;t leas than supran.ational qual1,

~mo~'t; serious or1.~e t):J.eEuropean Oommuni ty ~a,sexper:t~nced
June 30 f 1;965,~~,"the Frenoh goveX'l:llQerit1'eoal~ed

; to :dtAte. 2

1t

M.BQegrJ. e1' j

8

am.baa!$,ad.()~:- to

'bhe European

$fte9tlng a Frenoh. boYcott 01 leaving an
,

OQlt1l11utl tt,l#

•.•· th us

t1enil?~~t'Ch..l.;r.;tt

"

~~llliJulY

through Deo"l»b." 196$ coxnmunityettortawe:rt*. dead...
.,

looked, The

- ..

.. ,
'

reaul$ot·~b.necember

indloatedan end. t-o the·boYOott

be.llRt 56%

On the' f1~st

This

...
.

mt:1y'l:u~ve

EED.

FX'enoh electlon

of tbe Frenchvot&d against de Gaulle..
.

,.
•

ot

1965

.

i

atrengthenedthe display of community oppoelt1on

lpeterJenk1rJs,

u~:rope t sFreeze, t'

(N.wStatesman.

LXX (July 9, 196$), :;7"
2

....

.'.

.

..

Edgar Stephen eon FurniSS,. Jr.,.. ".FrenchForelgnP011C Y, "
CU:J:'r'en t. fr1storl, L (Apr! 1, 196b), 213.

J-!-5
to him. l

De Gaulle himself may have fe·l t e. need to o'btain

greeter 13upport in France b3' rejoining BEO.

At any rate, in

Janua.ry- 1966 negQ'tit\tions resumed, though they only resulted
in agreeing to qieagree, and struoturally the E1J;c stalemate

con tinued. 2
In the last two or three ye$ra,' lome Westdl-ermana
haVe beeom., disillualGlled. wIth. interne. t1onallam.)

outside th. Common P>'lark,et 11

to France'.

mo~e

Trade

important to Gerrtl8nythen

Was the EEe ,aIm of • oommon eeol"l'oml<l 'policy

IIeally'sole to aeoomodate, the be1&t1nt$re$te of hot1'loutwQ:rdlook1bg Germlnyandlrrward look\1ngFranee?'
,

Germans btgan to

ec,o.notny.

.'

.

"

wonder"lt REO

,w.,. nota d:rag on

'the 'Germany

'Fort tne1'l1E}J;(j was,me:ant to give Germany 'apa,th back

toaoeept8.fte~ Ell 8.

natlons.nd 0n.oe thQtwaaachieveq. the

appealwe.s. gre$tly dlmlnl$hed. 4
thtlid

Some

large.t

Germanyin'1964 h.d >the

g:rOlanat1opal produot!rl' the ',We"l'ld:~t,t 1$

-nowbnd.ar' th~t Wl111~';and~ has deelAX'ed;"W.·:cWe,s.t aetrm.ans
cannot' :be an econom1c·'gt..ritand a pollt1eal'dwarf'a·tthe
same, 'time."
.

'1'0 de Gaulle;
-'"

,

whocori$l$tentll,.*-,intait~(tdtnat'lnu.rope
~'I~ ;,'t- ';_~'. ',~, ,~,.,)~

'

1ftHas It, ReallyChanged,ft'$conom1a,t, CCCXVI! (Deoember
11, ·1965), 1173.
'.
','-"~

2FurnissJ "French For$:l..gn Policy," 2,31.

3lienr-y c. Wolfe, tt AWorr1ed Look et West Ger~many, n
XLIX (March 26, 1966), 22.

$aturdalR~view,

4scnmakel, 287.

5Wolfe,
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1s made up ot nation at. tea, there w•• nothing unusual or
unexpected in German nationalism coming to the fore.
. a.lw.·Y's existed.

German reunification wa, .. point

natlon,lietl0 drive.

It was the desire for

or

Ge~m.n

It
thll

re-

unification that led Adenauer to ohoose alllanoewlth the
West in o:rder to be in • strong pos! tlon for flJvent'l.lal

negotiating with the eovlet Union.
that polioy, but

.1~h•• ll.d

Erhard oontlnued

the importanoe

or

the United

States, rather thIn F:tlropem integration, to German reunification.

During the Adenauer year8, de atlulletrled

to establish Weet Germany'_ role ••• divided state,
oontrolled by the European Community, and .! an effective
ally in .trengthen1ng the West with. focus on France,l

Erhard ohallenged

th~.

European view and did not consider

independence trom the Un! ted

of the Federal Republio.

St.~te.

in the best intereat

De Gaulle had uaed the crises

in EEO in an attempt to pressure Germany into loosening
tle$ with the United St.tel.

Hie realization th.t Weat

Germany wae not going to play the role that he had eat
for

he~

led de

If •

G.ull~

d.lv1d~d

to consider a new

Ge~man

pollcy.

Germ.Tty would not eerve Franoe'. purpose,

pe:rhape ., reunified one would.

At the Februa.Y'

4, 1965

presa oonfepenoe, President de Gaulle said that German
reunification was an objeot of French foreign policy, and
1

Godfrey, 130.
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that the price ot Oe%'man x-eunlt1oatlon
armaments and trontlere.

Wl.8

The moat common

an agreement on
1nte~p~etatlon

put on de Gaulle's reference to armaments was that he meant
no nuolear weapon. for Germans; it was also alsumed that

when he spoke of frontiers he meant the Oder...N.,1e.e line. 1
In.addition, he demanded that Germany had to be

factor tor p.aoe and progre.s."

1m

ttaaaurted

But how could Germany be

kept assuredly peaceful within the boundaries oontaining

East and 'Weat Oermany

a.

they ex1.'.d. In 19651

E•• tern

Europe had to be brought 1n'o <tont.in aermany 1n the e.st

while France ·provided thai ••rv1ce in the west,

For this

purpo •• UJJ;agre,ement Lwlth the Sovl.' Un'ion wal neoesaary.2

Mutual Franoo-Ru•• ian d•• ire to .ee nucl.ar arm. kept out

ot

Germany and to .ee

AmeJ"1omtJ"OOP.l~aveEuJ"ope
asr~ement

the basis toJ" the hope that .uch an

reaohed.

De Gaulle antic1pated thai

provided

coUld be

d1.~.gr.ementa between
~;

Peking ap.d fvloloo'W would make the

SOV1.t1~
'\

Un1onmor$ w1111ng

to seek the benetita to b. derived

rromt cooperation

France on a·mutual Germanpo11cy.

De a.ulle ba.ed hi •

. design, on two .ssumptions t

w1th

One was tha,t the Soviet Union

would part with East Germany; the leoond wa. that Germany

1ftGrPMykO Oome. to Pari.," The Econom1at, COX1I1
(May 1, 1965), 510,

2Joeeph Kraft, "What Does de Gaulle Want?"- Current
XXXV (May, J.966), 10,.

would acoept dominion by the
national reun1on. l

~eli

of

Europero~

the sake of

Theneoeseary px-erequls1te to de Gaulle's neW Germ.an
policy was. Franoo-Rusalan rapprochement.
I!IUCOeSBors',

Khrulchev'a

aware ot Franco-German dl seord, 'published

two

messagee ana two editorial. in PraVda and Izvestia laying
th~

groundwork: tormbJ:'e oordial rela tiona between Jiloaoow

and Plri.~2

The tlrat odnoret. 'action wa• • Prenchgrlnt

ot seven year credit. to the Bovle' Union 10 a FrancoRussian 'trade agreement in

speech on

Ootob.~

a.man reunification

1964.

Then de Gaulle's

11'1 1965wa. followed up bY'

a change ot'Ru.a1m atnb••••dor.:'

the higher ranking

'Valerian Zor!n X'eplaoed 'SeztgeY' Vlnogradov .s arub.seador to

France, and'thl8 wa. taken to 1ndio.teau.sian 'reoeptivene8s
to French appro a ohe I .

On MaY' 1, 196 $ Hu. .1. t. Fo:re1gn

Minister Andr.l Grom1ko visited Paria, ar.d Germany. wa. the
primary 1.iued1scu••• d during tnl. viali.

At about the

.am. time there ooourred an int.rest1ng indireot 111u••
tration ot a posBible 'rapprochement:

the Soviet Union

ohose the Fr$noh system of color telev1elon over those ot

west·

Ge~any

and the UnIted Statel, -.nd moet of Eastern

Tmrope, including East Germany followed the Soviet's lead
;,'

,

1rtDe Gaulle's Golden Gate," Eoonomist, COXIV (February 1.3, 196.$) ,6$4..
, ,. 2"~r1ehdlY Breeie!," Eoonomist, COXIII (October 31,

1964), 492.
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in that choioe.

Th1a meant that if We8v Germany followed

through on 1'15 own 8"8tem or on the Amerioan system, it
would not be able to
way,

Fra~:UH'>

~e·.c~

East German soreen$.

In this

and the Soviet Union quickly .howed west

Germany how effectively they oan work together.
Being in the middle, We.t Germany did not like the
turn French polioy! took,

Welt Germany wa. pleased when

France approved the German propos.l that the United

st.'.a,

Br1 tam and france tluSg•• ' to the Soviet Union the setting

up ot a permanent committee to study German reun1fleatlon.2
But later developmenta, beg1nn1ns with the long term credits
which Franoe' extended to the Soviet Union, aroused west
German hOltll1ty.
1
Herbert Luthy, "De Gaulle: Pose and Policy," Foreign
Afta1ra, XLIX! (July, 1965),' $62,

2nLove in • Cold Olimate," Eoonomist, eCXIV (January

23, 1965),

328~

I

v•
In spite

or

OON CLUSI ON

the Ghange. that have taken place 1n hil

tactic., President de Gaulle'. long range go.la remained
Whether hi. words were uttered in 1946 or 1965,

unchanged.

when de Gaulle spoke ot France he insIsted that her'deetiny we •••• great uld 1ndep.ndent world power.
this part,

F~.noe

To live

must be aecurely protected militarily,

soundly established economloally,and sutficiently respected diplom•. tically.

Any polIcy aL--necl at obtaining'

the •• Frenoh object!••• had to oonsider Germany'. position.

Frenoh government. tried to keep Germany unarmed or in a
subordinate po.ltlon ml11tax-11y through the demilitarization plan. ot the post war year., through the EDe effort.

ot the early 1950's, and through NATO limit. in the 1960·s.
The l •• t trend dl.oernable in Frenoh pollcy, whioh became

clear in 1964 and 196$, WI' the lugg•• tlon

or •

ment ot Germany by France and Ea.tern Europe.

cont.inDespite

the effort. ot French governments, however, Germlny by

1965 had. revived militarily a. evldencedby a nationll
army wholly committed to NATO and by involvement in the
'MLF

projeot.
Eoonom1c dealings with

w•• t

Germany were inevit.ble

considering France and Germany's geographl0 position 1n
the heart of Western
e~plo1t.tion

~urope.

'l'he first postwar policy ot

of Germany oeased to be the only French

51
Approaoh when Marshall P18n aid became available.

The

.moat durable contribution to Franeo-Germ.n rel•. tione W'.s

the establishment or the European Community.

In spite or

Technioal diffioultlel end divergent viewpoints, the
European Community had accomplished mueh in European induetrial recovery.

Even de GaUlle, 'Who disagreed fund.·

mentelly with the lntegratlonlata aspeots ot the Community, oontinued French participation in EEC and worked
to implement BEe in order to advance French economio inIn partlcul.r in the rleld of agriCUlture there

tereeta.

was French advantage in aerm.n oooperation in EEC.

France _merged from World War II a. • power of
aecond,'not tlr_t rank.

H.~

view. regarding postwar

Germany did not carry enough weight with her a111&8 to b,
effeotive.

When French functionalist. plaoed France at

the tore of the Europe.n unlflca tlon movemen t, they took
the first step toward

r~.toring

French prestige.

Through

leadership in the European Community Franc8 made her Influence tel t in Germany •. s well as in other part! of the

world,

But the Fourth Republio, for the moat

p.~t,

lieved in a stl'ong Atlantio alliance as • means

ing a

d1plom.tlc.ll~·

unified front,.

or

bepresent-

When de Gaulle re-

tux-ned to leadership in Franoe, he e,tabllshed, on the
oontrary, an independent Frenoh foreign polioy which direotly used the Community machinery to further French diplomatic alma.

When he decided that the l!:uropean bal moe

or

$2

power had ohanged, the Frenchpl'eeldent

.fo:rmul.t~d

his own

pollcy on hqwtod,eal with Germany, .eek1ng ne1 the%o:r con.eent -from

~r.nce'.

allies,.

l'e+.at1o.ns w1th·:Germany m.y

Whatever twistlor tUM'

t.~e,.Pre.1dent

de Gaulle

tabl1abed the tenent. that French polioy will be.
pen~f);no ••

.<1.v~se'

lnde~

-lld that Germany mu.t aerv. that,tenent. 02:'

Frattoo.Qel'nlan,

~el.t1~n.

wl1lnou,progre •• smoothly_

e.-
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